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Bankruptcy as an Occasion for
Restitutionary Claims
William F. Young, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION

Judge Joseph S. Lord III, of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
has recently given us a glimpse of a recurrent ideal for bankruptcy
administration'-one that may fairly be called a restitutionary ideal.
If there were bankruptcies in Utopia they would presumably be run
along the lines he envisaged; according to this ideal, claims against a
bankruptcy estate would be recognized solely on the ground that
otherwise the estate would be unjustly enriched. In pursuing that
goal Judge Lord was following a certain tradition, and he flew the
banner that is always flown on these occasions: "Courts of bankruptcy
are courts of equity."2 What is more natural for a court in that great
tradition than to treat each claimant according to his just deserts,?
What one of them gains, the others lose-for it is characteristic of
bankruptcy that there is not enough to go around. We may, therefore,
easily conceive of all bankruptcy claims problems as problems in
restitution. "The conception of unjust enrichment as ordinarily defined includes not only gain on one side but loss on the other, with a
tie of causation between them."3 Under a restitutionary regime of
bankruptcy, we would allow to each claimant his exact contribution
to the community of interests called the estate.
Secured claims can stand no differently: "A bankruptcy claimant
...
which relies on its security is 'asking a favor' of the bankruptcy
court."4 If the claim is inequitable, the fact that it is valid and perfected by state law is not controlling. The "favor" is not to be refused
altogether, of course, if the claimant has made a substantial contribution to the estate. To assess his contribution accurately requires the
court to make a strenuous effort of judgment: it must take into ac0 Professor of Law, Columbia University.
1. See In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
2. Young v. Higbee Co., 324 U.S. 204, 214 (1945). What judge Lord actually cited
was Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 240 (1934): "[C]ourts -of bankruptcy are
essentially courts of equity, and their proceedings inherently proceedings in equity."

3. Dawson, Restitution or Damages?, 20 OHMo ST. L.J. 175, 176 (1959).
4. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., supra note 1, at 869. The "asking a favor" phrase was
derived from Fosdick v. Schall, 99 U.S. 235, 253 (1878), via Manufacturers' Fin. Co.
v. McKey, 294 U.S. 442, 449 (1935). Fosdick was part of what has been called "the
Supreme Court's railroad jurisprudence." 2 GiLMonE, SEcunnY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL
PROPERTY § 28.3, at 756 (1965).
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count such things as the risk he ran in giving credit, the effect of the
security agreement on the borrower's business, the other sources of
credit that the borrower might have found, the custom of lenders, and
the requirements of commerce.
The propositions and -factors just mentioned were expressed by
Judge Lord in a thoughtful and witty opinion dealing with contracts
between two bankrupts and a finance company ("Fidelity"), under
which the latter received assignments of accounts receivable. The
contracts fixed a high rate of interest and contained several very harsh
terms, leading the bankruptcy referee to call them unconscionable. 5
Judge Lord remanded for further hearings; but he gave general
approval to the remedy applied by the referee: requiring that Fidelity
pay into the estate the excessive interest it had collected prior to
bankruptcy, and all money collected by it from the assigned accounts
after the date of bankruptcy. He said that the referee should determine what was a reasonable rate of interest by considering the
same elements (the custom, the risks, the setting) that might require
condemnation of the security agreement. The object of the remedy
suggested would be to prevent unjust enrichment of the finance company at the expense of other creditors:
[I]nasmuch as claims arising from quasi-contractural obligations are provaonce the referee had refused to enforce the contracts
it would also have been entirely appropriate, in achieving 'a balance of
ble in bankruptcy ...

equities between creditor and creditor' . . . to scale Fidelity's claims for

profiting at the exinterest down to a reasonable rate to prevent it from
6
pense of others from its unconscionable contracts.

I consider that Judge Lord staked out too large a claim for the

equitable discretion of bankruptcy courts, and that the issues he posed
for the referee are unmanageable . There is no general mandate in
the Bankruptcy Act to calculate the benefit conferred on the estate by
creditors, secured or unsecured, and so far as benefits conferred on
the bankrupt are concerned, it is non-bankruptcy law that determines
whether or not they give rise to claims. So far from directing the
courts to grant occasional "favors" to secured parties by recognizing
their interests, the Act "simply does not authorize a trustee to distribute other people's property among a bankrupt's creditors."8
5. In re Dorset Steel Equip. Co., 2 UCC RE,. Sry.1016 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (referee's
opinion); In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 2 UCC REP. SEmv. 1021 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (referee's
opinion). In these proceedings the trustee sought to make something of § 2-302 of
the UCC: Unconscionable Contract or Clause. (The Code was applicable state law.)
Article 9 of the UCC, on Secured Transactions, has no corresponding provision, and
Judge Lord did not claim support for his decision in local law.
6. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., supra note 1, at 875.
7. "The ultimate question for the referee," he said, "will be whether these contracts
were, inthe light of all the circumstances, reasonable commercial devices." Id. at 874.
8. Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 135-36 (1962). See also Polish v.
Johnson Serv. Co., 333 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1964).
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Whether or not these views are correct, 9 it is useful to reflect upon

the restitutionary ideal of bankruptcy. It is well, for one thing, to
have clear ideas about how far the commands of the Bankruptcy Act
disregard the ideal, so as to be on guard against appeals to the justice
of the moment.' 0 It is well also to consider how the scheme of bank-

ruptcy might be brought into closer conformity to concepts of restitution. A leading feature of the existing scheme is the distinction

between benefits conferred on the bankrupt and benefits conferred

on the estate. It is true that these two notions cannot be entirely
abstracted, one from the other; but it is probably true also that no

administratively feasible bankruptcy law could be constructed without some mechanism for sorting out claims along that line of division.

A thoroughgoing program for putting bankruptcy claims on an
"equity" footing would have no premise other than benefit to the
estate. It would also purge the Bankruptcy Act of many of its
references to state law, replacing them with doctrines devised for use
only in bankruptcy proceedings. Such a program is out of the question; therefore, it is a continuing challenge to place the non-bankruptcy
law of restitution (hardly cognizant of benefits to a bankruptcy estate)
in proper relation to bankruptcy law."
Although the concept of unjust enrichment is not a cornerstone
of bankruptcy law, there is hardly any principle of the law of restitution that might not figure decisively in an appropriate bankruptcy
matter. The claims and property interests coming to the bar of bank-

ruptcy courts have to be assessed quite regularly according to nonbankruptcy law, chiefly state law;u and these courts have "the law of
9. These criticisms of Judge Lord's decision are of course argumentative, but this
is not the place to pursue the argument. He was partly misled, I think, by a decision
of his Court of Appeals: In re Laskin, 316 F.2d 70 (3d Cir. 1963). The general context of the question is sketched in GILMORE, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 13.1, 45.2. See
Guerin v. Weil, Cotshal & Manges, 205 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1953) for a useful caution:
"Although it has been broadly stated that a bankruptcy court is a court of equity, . . .
the exercise of its equitable powers must be strictly confined within the prescribed
limits of the Bankruptcy Act .... ." Id. at 304. See also 3 CoLL=IE, BAMNRUPTCY f
63.03(3) (14th ed. rev. 1965) [Hereinafter cited as CoLL=IR; Hill, The Erie Doctrine
in Bankruptcy, 66 HARv. L. REv. 1013 (1953).
10. Judge Lord was himself well on guard against "impassioned appeals to equity":
"It would be unsound to encourage bankruptcy trustees or general creditors to attempt
to escape lawful factoring debts . . . unsound because it would be inconsistent with
the scheme of the Bankruptcy Act and because it would tend to dry up the credit of
businesses which need it most." In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., supra note 1, at 871. In
this and other passages Judge Lord shows that he does not think of bankruptcy law
as simply a branch of the law of restitution. All that he said on that subject I have
quoted.
11. "There is no boundary line, capable of being precisely located and mapped, between the domains of federal and state law." 2 Gmmons, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1286.
12. 3 CoLLmR 1111
63.02, 63.03(3), 63.07; 4 CoLLIE f 70.04; MAcLAcmAN, BANKRnPTCY

§§ 133, 168 (1956) [Hereinafter cited as

MAcLAcmHLN].

This is so, notwithstanding the fact that "bankruptcy law in this country has a federal
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restitution," broadly conceived, 13 as part of their ordinary equipment.
It would be tedious business to demonstrate the truth of this state-

ment. What would be interesting and useful instead is a survey, yet
to be made, of the instances in which (federal) bankruptcy law
overrides state (or other) rules of restitution, and in which the
Bankruptcy Act radiates its own principles of restitution.
Restitutionary principles in relation to creditors' claims against
the estate make up one field of inquiry-a relatively narrow one.
Another field of inquiry, much harder to exhaust, is the use of such

principles in relation to the trustee's power to avoid transfers of the
debtor's property. As will be seen, a trustee's power of avoidance may
be facilitated by a restitutionary concept; but more commonly, it is
the case that a transferee makes defensive use of such a concept, attempting to show that avoidance of his transfer would entail unjust
enrichment of the bankruptcy estate. The trustee's powers of avoidance give rise also to claims that, as between two persons interested
in the estate, one has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the
other; these claims are particularly interesting for the light they throw
on the scheme of the Bankruptcy Act, and the connection between

bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy law. Fruitful inquiry might also be
made into the interaction of bankruptcy and restitutionary rules in
such areas as suretyship, 14 priority of claims, 5 and tracing, 16 but this
paper is confined to the topics mentioned, as they appear in "straight"
bankruptcy proceedings.
Whether we are concerned with claims against the estate or with
voidable transfers, it is essential to note that the Bankruptcy Act
character and a degree of uniformity which distinguishes it from most of the other subjects in the field of commercial law." MAcLAcunAIr, § 23, at 18. Note the references
to Texas law in Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375 (1966). But see the citations in note
9 supra.
13. Very general references are to be understood by "restitution" and "restitutionary"
principles and concepts, as used here. For a warrant of the usage see the RsTATEAxNT,
R.snrrroN § 7 (1937); See also Dawson, supra note 3, at 175 (describing the restitutionary remedies as a "litter of Topsies"); Seavey & Scott, Restitution, 54 L.Q. REV. 29
(1938).
14. See 3 CoLL= 1157.21; MAcLAcHmL
§§ 145, 270.
15. See Home Indem. Co. v. F.H. Donovan Painting Co., 325 F.2d 870 (8th Cir.
1963); Lawrence v. Delta Metals, Inc., 280 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1960); Note, Subrogation to Government Prioritiesin Bankruptcy, 65 COLuM. L. REv. 895 (1965).
16. See Cunningham v. Brown, 265 U.S. 1 (1924); Central States Corp. v. Luther,
215 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1954); In re Rhine, 241 F. Supp. 86 (D. Colo. 1965).
I have sought to stay clear of the controversies whirling about § 60 and equitable liens
and article 9 security interests, although the participants in this exercise have freely used
the concepts of restitution as counters. See HONNOLD, CASES ON SALES & SALES FINANCrNG, ch. 8, § 3 (2d ed. 1962); FANswoaru & HONNOLD, CASES ON COMMERCIAL LAw,
ch. 11, § 3 (1965)'; 2 GmoRE, op. cit. supra note 4, §§ 45.5 -.7, 45.9 (1965), and
references gieA there. In this, I should say, they are quite justified, for the reception
accorded to state tracing rules in bankruptcy is in some sense the measure of the
trustee's avoiding powers.
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makes the filing of a bankruptcy petition a decisive event: a transaction occurring after the filing is likely to have consequences far
different from what would have ensued if it had occurred before. The
date of filing is, indeed, one of the very meanings of the word "bankruptcy" as it appears in the act.7 This point of distinction must be

observed in each part of the discussion that follows. In the main, Part
II concerns restitutionary principles in relation to claims against the
estate; and Part III concerns certain of the trustee's powers to avoid
transfers by the debtor, as affected by concepts of restitution. It is
undesirable to be rigorous in this division of the subject, however.
II.

REsTLUIONARY PBINCwPLES IN

AGAINST

RELATION TO CLAIMS

=rE ESTATE

After the filing of an involuntary petition, there is a period of time
in which a provable claim may arise "by reason of property transferred
or services rendered by the creditor to the bankrupt for the benefit
of the estate." The conditions are stated in section 63b of the act.'8
During somewhat the same period of time the act affords protection
to persons who deal with the bankrupt "in good faith"-not ordinarily
including those who know of the bankruptcy proceedings. The conditions are stated in section 70d of the act. 19 Neither of these pro17. Bankruptcy Act § 1 (13), 52 Stat. 841 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1 (13) (1964)
(formerly Bankruptcy Act § 1 (10), 30 Stat. 544 (1898)). See 1 COLLIM ff 1.13;
MAcLACHLAN § 169. But cf. Segal v. Rochelle, supra note 12.
18. Bankruptcy Act § 63b, 52 Stat. 873 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 103b (1964). The section
reads:
"In the interval after the filing of an involuntary petition and before the appointment
of a receiver or the adjudication, whichever first occurs, a claim arising in favor of a
creditor by reason of property transferred or services rendered by the creditor to the
bankrupt for the benefit of the estate shall be provable to the extent of the value of
such property or services."
19. Bankruptcy Act § 70d, 52 Stat. 881-82 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110d (1964). So
far as relevant to this paper, the section reads:
"After bankruptcy and either before adjudication or before a receiver takes possession of the property of the bankruptcy, whichever first occurs(1) A transfer of any of the property of the bankrupt, other than real estate, made
to a person acting in good faith shall be valid against the trustee if made for a present
fair equivalent value or, if not made for a present fair equivalent value, then to the
extent of the present consideration actually paid therefor, for which amount the transferee shall have a lien upon the property so transferred;
(2) A person indebted to the bankrupt or holding property of the bankrupt may,
if acting in good faith, pay, such indebtedness or deliver such property, or any part
thereof, to the bankrupt or upon his order, with the same effect as if the bankruptcy
were not pending . . .
(4) The provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subdivision shall not apply
where a receiver or trustee appointed by a United States or State court is in possession
of all or the greater portion of the nonexempt property of the bankrupt;
(5) A person asserting the validity of a transfer under this subdivision shall have
the burden of proof. Except as otherwise provided in this subdivision . .

.

.no transfer
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visions concerns benefits conferred on the estate directly, as by
administrative services. Benefits of that character commonly give
rise to claims having a priority position. In discussing such claims,
the Collier treatise on Bankruptcy lists "The Benefit Principle" as one
of several controlling factors 2 and traces it to Holmes' opinion in
Randolph v. Scruggs.21 The restitutionary aspect of this matter would
be a part of a comprehensive survey of our subject, but will not be
examined here. For present purposes it is enough to say that the
Benefit Principle carries little weight in connection with post-bankruptcy dealings with the bankrupt. A lawyer named Myers learned
this to his sorrow when he arranged for a client to purchase some
accounts receivable from a bankrupt. After the client collected some
7,000 dollars of them, the bankruptcy trustee (Kohn) successfully
called it to account for the receivables and their proceeds in Kohn V.
Myers&2 The purchase price-more than 16,000 dollars-had been
applied to priority claims against the estate. In rejecting an appeal
against the trustee's recovery, the court said: "It will not avail a
transferee to argue that the estate was not depleted, that there has
been no fraud and that the estate has been benefited. The appellants
here assumed the burden of dealing with the bankrupt and all the
attendant risks."23 The court did suggest, however, that Myers and
his client "would seem entitled to file a claim" under section 63b.24
Nevertheless, it is not entirely true that general ideas of restitution
are irrelevant to post-petition dealings with a bankrupt. The same
court that decided Kohn v. Myers had later to consider a bankrupt's
payment of indebtedness incurred after the petition was filed, and
succeeded in protecting the payee under section 70d.21 One of the
criteria provided by that section is "present fair equivalent value."
The court showed its allegiance to the underlying principle of restiby or in behalf of the bankrupt after the date of bankruptcy shall be valid against the
trustee...."
20. 3 CoLLIR
62.05(2). For a suggestion as to the status of claims for benefit
conferred through extensions of credit to the unadjudicated bankrupt, see MAcLACmEAN
§ 140. Contra, 3 CoLL ER ff 63.34.
21. 190 U.S. 533 (1903). See Treister, The Effect of Bankruptcy on the Administrative Expenses of a Superseded General Assignment, 17 Bus. LAw. 332 (1962).
As to the quantum of allowance to a landlord, and the significance of the date of
bankruptcy, see S & W Holding Co. v. Kuriansky, 317 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1963). A
restitutionary claim based on the trustee's use of another's premises was made in In te
Seatrade Corp., 345 F.2d 785 (2d Cir. 1965), and rejected as leading to a windfall
for the claimant; the court came close to characterizing him as a volunteer. For a suggestion that restitutionary rights may accrue to the trustee because of his sharing of
leased premises with another, see Lama Co. v. Union Bank, 315 F.2d 750 (9th Cir.
1963).
22. 356 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1959).
23. Id. at 357.
24. Ibid.
25. Kass v. Doyle, 275 F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1960).
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tution by shaping that expression in conformity to the general concept "enrichment." Taking an enlarged view of "present ... value,"
the court protected the transferee because his services were of "aid in
the protection of the assets available for creditors";2 it rejected the
"assumption that the statute protects only those transactions which
result in an immediate balance sheet increase in the assets of the
debtor."2 Evidently the court was persuaded that the estate would
be unjustly enriched if the trustee were to recapture the debtor's
payment for the post-bankruptcy services.
Moving back to the period before bankruptcy, we may find that
benefit to the estate results from some exertion that does not yield a
claim against the bankrupt. Let us say that a creditor's pursuit of
the debtor prior to bankruptcy was so efficient and extraordinary that
benefits accrue to the estate as a result. Is a claim against the estate
warranted, under bankruptcy law, by reason of such a benefit? No
one has suggested (and presumably no one will) that proof and
allowance of a claim of this genre could be authorized by nonbankruptcy law. If the claim exists, we may be sure that it is based
on general considerations of bankruptcy law-upon what may be
called restitutionary emanations from the act; and the rule will be
couched in the rhetoric of "equitable power" vested in the courts of
bankruptcy. The act does not explicitly authorize proof of the claim
in question, not being one chargeable to the bankrupt himself,28 and
it is possible that this is a conclusive objection to its allowance.
A case that came somewhere near to forcing the issue was In re
Billelo.29 John Krauss, Inc., apparently a trade creditor of Billelo's,
employed a lawyer and a detective to prosecute its claim. During the
week before the bankruptcy petition was filed, it commenced suit and
levied attachment. The cost to the creditor was said to exceed 1,200
dollars, and the effect of its action, as found, was to "preserve the
assets at the bankrupts premises for the benefit of the estate." The
court disallowed Krauss' claim:
Despite the fact that the fruits of the creditor's efforts inured to the benefit
of the bankrupt estate, the creditor's expenditures are viewed to have been
26. Id. at 262. The court referred for support to the mention of "services rendered"
in § 63b of the act, quoted in note 18 supra. A contrary view had been expressed in
In re Autocue Sales & Distrib. Corp., 167 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). Compare
the bankrupts own claim based on the post-bankruptcy payment of an attorney's fee.
Kolb v. Berlin, 356 F.2d 269 (5th Cir. 1966). A benefit conferred on the bankrupt, in
the form of services rendered before the date of bankruptcy, is of course not "present
fair equivalent value" for a payment thereafter-not being a benefit for the estate.
Schilling v. McAllister Bros., 310 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1962).
27. Kass v. Doyle, supra note 25, at 262.
28. Section 63a of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 873 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 103a
(1964), begins: "Debts of the bankrupt may be proved and allowed against the
estate .... ." (Emphasis added.) See 3 COLLIER ir 63.03.
29. 171 F. Supp. 69 (E.D.N.Y. 1959).
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made in its own interests to such an extent as not to warrant the application
of any equitable power which may rest in the Court.30

The court expressed doubt that it had any such power in the premises,

except as specifically authorized in the act. Note well, however, that
the court discounted the "equity" of the creditor's demand. By
combining a doubt as to the injustice of his loss with a doubt as to its
own power, the court avoided making an abstract pronouncement that

a restitutionary claim against an estate cannot be allowed. It is well
not to be doctrinaire about the matter. 31
Yet it does not seem probable, or desirable, that the allowance of
such claims under the present act will ever become more than a
freakish departure from general practice. The Bankruptcy Act criteria for allowing and disallowing claims are not vague prescriptions
for doing justice. 32 They are concrete specifications designed to compromise a set of discordant aims: to give the bankrupt a clear field
for future effort, to deal "equally" with creditors, to simplify ad-

ministration, to make proceedings uniform and predictable. As a
sacrifice to these and other legislative aims, nice judicial calculations
of enrichment-not to speak of justice-are often ruled out.
To be distinguished from benefit to the estate as a basis for a

claim is benefit conferred on the bankrupt. To the extent that the
latter gives rise to a restitutionary claim under applicable state (nonbankruptcy) law, such a claim will generally be allowed in bankruptcy as a matter of course. It cannot be said that the books are
full of illustrations; presumably, they are not because unsecured
claims in bankruptcy are not worth much. 33 The principle is usually
manifested in relation to discharge of the bankrupt's debts; it has
been held many times in that context that "a liability upon quasi30. Id. at 70. See also Guerin v. Weill, Gotshal & Manges, supra note 9; In re Siegel,
252 Fed. 197 (S.D.N.Y. 1918), rev'd on other grounds, 256 Fed. 226 (2d Cir. 1919)
(creditor's services, although of benefit to the estate, "merely volunteered").
31. "In an atypical situation, however, equitable considerations may still afford
sufficient flexibility to authorize a court to allow costs and expenses. Likewise considerations of equity still have their field of application, for instance, with regard to ex'penses
incurred in pre-bankruptcy proceedings .... " 3 COLLIa f 62.21, at 1551. Compare
the "equitable lien" supposed by Professor MacLachlan to exist for one who preserves
assets prior to the petition. MAcLACHLAN § 141 n.7. See generally 3 CoLLum f
64.102(2). As to pre-bankruptcy proceedings, see 3 COLLIER f1 62.03(4), and note 21
supra.
32. See the Bankruptcy Act §§ 57, 63 & 64, 52 Stat. 866, 873-74 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
§§ 93, 103-04 (1964). See note 9 supra. The Act does provide that claims once allowed may be reallowed or rejected "according to the equities of the case" in certain
instances-§ 57k (11 U.S.C. 93k); but this has been called "merely a procedural provision . . . [having] nothing to do with the substantive question of what claims are
provable ...." 3 COLLIER § 57.23(3), at 363-64.
33. "General creditors recover only eight cents on the dollar in the 13% of the cases
where creditors receive anything." Countryman, The Bankruptcy Boom, 77 HARy. L.
REv. 1452, 1454 (1964).
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contract is one upon an 'implied contract,' and so provable in
bankruptcy ... ."- A better illustration is a non-discharge case, such
as In re Petroleum Carriers Co.3 5 The bankrupt company had received a sort of prepayment under an executory contract that proved
to be unenforceable under the Statute of Frauds. The other party,
Gamble, filed a claim based on the payment, and the bankruptcy
court allowed it, saying:
The payment made by Gamble certainly conferred an immediate benefit
upon the bankrupt to the amount of the overcharge. All of the circumstances
of the transaction, in view of bankrupt's admittedly urgent need for cash,
generates (sic) an inference that the real and only purpose of the exaction

was to swell the coffers of bankrupt.
Where, as here, money is paid or property transferred under an unenforceable agreement, equity and good conscience require that the recipient,

to the extent that he is unjustly enriched thereby, be compelled to disgorge. 35

The claim described here, unlike the one in Billelo's case, must be
37
rooted in and limited by non-bankruptcy principles of restitution.
III. TRUSTEE'S PowEns To Avom TRANSFERS BY THE
DEBTOR AS AFFECTED BY CONCEPTS OF RESTITUTION

The Bankruptcy Act provides a trustee with various powers of
avoiding transfers made by a debtor both before and after the "date
of bankruptcy." The general conception is that the estate available
for distribution to creditors ought not to be depleted by "fraudulent"
transfers, or by last-minute transfers and seizures of assets that prefer
one creditor over another.38 The idea of loss-depletion-diminution
of assets-is a recurrent theme in the literature concerning these
powers; and unwarranted gain is a note also frequently sounded, although perhaps less often. Occasionally the reverberation of these
ideas, so characteristic of the law of restitution, drowns out the subtle
harmonies (or disharmonies) of the Bankruptcy Act. So it happened,.
I believe, in the Fourth Circuit case Aulick v. Largent.39 The court

ir

34. Brown v. O'Keefe, 300 U.S. 598, 607 (1937), 176 (1904); see 3 COLLIER
63.25(2)(5); MAcLAcHLA. § 134.
35. 121 F. Supp. 520 (D. Minn. 1954).
36. Id. at 527. Actually, it was found that what is called here a prepayment "was.
not a premium but was merely a device whereby [the president of the bankrupt]
sought to unjustly enrich the corporation."
37. But see text accompanying note 2 supra.
In re Kolber, 49 F. Supp. 378 (E.D. Pa. 1942), aff'd mem., 134 F.2d 615 (3d Cir.
1943), reduced an otherwise provable claim of $159,750 to a fraction of $1,000 byreason of state law as to rights of contribution among co-obligors.
38. See 3 COLLIER II 60.01, 4 COLLmR f 70.04; 2 Gnm.oaO_, op. cit. supra note 4,
§§ 45.1-.10; MAcLAcux.", §§ 201-10, 221-77, .282-87 (compare especially § 202).
39. 295 F.2d 41 (4th Cir. 1961).
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held there, on a third appeal, that Mrs. Aulick had received a voidable
transfer in the nature of a preference. (The act defines "preference"

in section 60a.40 ) She had been given the bankrupt's note, indorsed

by a third person, Lemley, in circumstances that would have been
preferential if payment had then been made. Unknown to her, Lemley had received a pledge of the bankrupt's property as an inducement
for his indorsement. On an earlier appeal in the case, the court
thought that someone must have received a preference: "Clearly,
the transfer of the security and Lemley's subsequent payment to Mrs.
Aulick ...did deplete the estate."41
It will be argued here that generalized notions of gain or loss will
not serve, when the reach of the trustee's avoiding powers is in question. In a degree, it is true that his statutory recoveries are restitutionary in character; 42 but the conditions for avoiding transfers are
nowise congruent with the basis of liability for unjust enrichment.
The act prescribes rather rigid-even mathematical-tests for the
bankruptcy court to apply, and they may or may not achieve the ideal
of restitution in favor of the estate. On a general view, one might
think that courts attuned to restitutionary considerations might be
biased against the exercise of the trustee's avoiding powers, in close
cases, out of concern for the stability of transactions.43 The law of
40. Bankruptcy Act § 60a, 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96a (1964). The
relevant portion reads:
"(1) A preference is a transfer, as defined in this title, of any of the property of
a debtor to or for the benefit of a creditor for or on account of an antecedent debt,
made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent and within four months before the
filing by or against him of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title, the
effect of which transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage of
his debt than some other creditor of the same class." See also note 42 infra.
41. Largent v. Lemley, 272 F.2d 66, 68 (4th Cir. 1959). Here the court cited no
authority. The ultimate result was foreshadowed as an "hypothesis" in Largent v.
Lemley, 256 F.2d 446 (4th Cir. 1958).
42. This fact can be seen, for instance, in the provision made for the terms of an
order avoiding a preferential transfer, under § 60b of the Bankruptcy Act, 52 Stat. 870
(1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96b (1964):
"Any such preference may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor receiving it or to
be benefited thereby or his agent acting with reference thereto has, at the time when
the transfer is made, reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent. Where
the preference is voidable, the trustee may recover the property or, if it has been con.
verted, its value from any person who has received or converted such property, except
a bona-fide purchaser from or lienor of the debtor's transferee for a present fair equivalent value: Provided however, That where such purchaser or lienor has given less than
such value, he shall nevertheless have a lien upon such property, but only to the extent
of the consideration actually given by him.. "
See WEwsaTm, THE B,miauTrcy AcT oF 1938, 121 (1938): "Subd. b of the old Act
provided that the trustee might recover the property or its value from the person receiving the transfer or to be benefited thereby. . . .This procedure was neither sound
nor equitable, since the estate was primarily entitled to restitution ...."
43. See Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, 57 HAI-v. L. REv. 1, 17-20 (1943). The
interest in maintaining bargains (see note 10 supra) is distinguishable, of course.
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restitution, however, is rather careful to allow for that interest, particularly in applying the bona fide purchase doctrine in favor of
creditors.4 As the Aulick case shows, the bias favoring transferees (if
it exists) is not so noticeable as a theoretician might conjecture; and

there are practical explanations for this 45 The opinion in that case

was unduly favorable to the trustee, in my view, because there was no
showing that property of the debtor was transferred on account of an
antecedent debt. His property was transferred
to one who then be46
came a surety, and that is not a preference.
Or is it? There is a rule of restitution-not adverted to by the court
-by which collateral given to a surety is held in constructive trust
4 7 Refor the creditor. This is the doctrine of Moses v. Murgatroyd.
calling that rule, and the inclusive bankruptcy definition of "transfer,"48
the trustee might plausibly have argued that the interest of Mrs.
49
Aulick in the pledged collateral was the vehicle for a preference.
Strange, sometimes, are the workings of restitutionary concepts in
relation to bankruptcy law.

Although we shall hope to find yet another lesson in the Aulick
case, it is time now to consider situations in which, for reasons at

least analogous to principles of restitution, it may be desirable to
restrict the trustee's avoiding powers. In order to isolate most cleanly

the impact such principles may be expected to have, we must look
44. BESTATE ENT, RESTrnTUTON §§ 13, 14, 172-76 (1937). For references to the
interest in security of transactions in the literature of restitution, see Macauley, Restitution in Context, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 1133, 1143-44 (1959); Patterson, Equitable Relief
for Unilateral Mistake, 28 COLUm. L. REV. 859, 883 (1928).
45. "The central figure in the pattern of bankruptcy administration under the Act of
1898 was the bankruptcy trustee, who was conceived as being not merely the passive
representative of the unsecured creditors but their champion.. . . He might have been
designed as an official whose primary duty was to hold the scales in even balance between the creditors who claimed property interests and the creditors who had no such
claims ....
Instead, the trustee became a sort of devil's advocate, whose function was
to resist, by every available device and stratagem, the assertion of such claims against
the estate. . . . Bankruptcy law, in practice, is what the referees say it is. The referees are recruited, naturally enough, from the specialized bankruptcy bar. They are
bankruptcy professionals . ... Thus the bias of bankruptcy law in favor of the unsecured creditor, the inarticulate striving toward the ideal of equal distribution among
all creditors, which is represented in the first instance by the trustee, is reinforced at
the referee level." 2 GiLMOrE, op. cit. supra note 4, at 1286-88.
46. The cases cited in Aulick v. Largent, supra note 39, at 48 n.10, do not appear
to have been distinguished effectively. The decision led the same court to an even more
startling conclusion in Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Woodson, 329 F.2d 836 (4th Cir. 1964).
47. 1 Johns. Ch. R. 118 (N.Y. Ch. 1814). See HANNA, CASES ON SECUBrry 545-48
(3d ed. 1959). The doctrine has been roundly criticized; see ABA,r, Smrysnn, § 80
(1931). Cf. Bankruptcy Act, § 1(28), 52 Stat. 842 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 1(28)(1964).
48. Bankruptcy Act, § 1(30), 52 Stat. 842 (1938), II U.S.C. § 1(30).
49. A case of this nature has not been found, although the doctrine of Moses v.
Murgatroyd has been invoked against a trustee. Grandison v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce,
231 Fed. 800 (2d Cir. 1916), cert. denied, 242 U.S. 644 (1916). Cf. Leo v. L & M
Realty Corp., 228 F.2d 89 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956).
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specifically to these situations rather than ones in which the gain-loss
equation favors the trustee. We may be pretty sure that when the
bankruptcy estate is said to be unjustly enriched there is a point of

tension between the restitutionary ideal and the text of the act.

It sometimes happens that the trustee's avoiding powers can yield
"cumulative" recoveries for the estate. That is to say, the trustee may
find he has two transfers (and even two transferees) to shoot at, al-

though the debtor's dealings, taken as a whole, have not depleted the
estate in the aggregate amount or value of what has been transferred.

Is it consistent with principles of restitution for him to avoid both
transfers? And if not, what is to be done about the problem of
"double recovery"?
In one situation, at least, the Bankruptcy Act expressly prohibits
multiple recoveries by the trustee, where he has multiple remedies.
50
Following an opinion written by Brandeis, in Dean v. Davis, a provision was introduced into the act characterizing certain transfers as
fraudulent-such as may be called "preference-enabling" transfers
for convenience. The section is 67d(3). 51 Its details do not concern

us here, but in loose paraphrase it voids a transfer made in contemplation of insolvency proceedings if, as the transferee knew, the debtor
intended to use the consideration obtained to give a preference. The
concluding sentence of section 67d(3) precludes cumulative recoveries: "The remedies of the trustee for the avoidance of such transfer
or obligation and of any ensuing preference shall be cumulative:

Provided, however, That the trustee shall be entitled to only one

satisfaction with respect thereto." Here, in plain terms, is a recognition that the cumulative remedies of the bankruptcy trustee mayif not curbed-result in unjust enrichment of the estate. "The purpose
of the draftsmen in adding the proviso was simply to obviate the
50. 242 U.S. 438 (1917). See also In re Beerman, 112 Fed. 663 (N.D. Ga. 1901), a
case which gained currency through being narrowly distinguished in the Supreme Court.
See Van Iderstine v. National Discount Co., 227 U.S. 575, 583 (1913); Marsh v. Walters,
220 Fed. 805 (6th Cir. 1915).
51. Bankruptcy Act § 67d(3), 52 Stat. 878 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 107d(3) (1964).
It is as follows:
"Every transfer made and every obligation incurred by a debtor who is or will thereby
be rendered insolvent, within four months prior to the filing of a petition initiating a
proceeding under this Act by or against him is fraudulent, as to then existing and future
creditors: (a) if made or incurred in contemplation of the filing of a petition initiating
a proceeding under this title by or against the debtor or in contemplation of liquidation
of all or the greater portion of the debtor's property, with intent to use the consideration
obtained for such transfer or obligation to enable any creditor of such debtor to obtain
a greater percentage of his debt than some other creditor of the same class, and (b)
if the transferee or obligee of such transfer or obligation, at the time of such transfer
or obligation, knew or believed that the debtor intended to make such use of such consideration. The remedies of the trustee for the avoidance of such transfer or obligation
and of any ensuing preference shall be cumulative: Provided, however, That the trustee
shall be entitled to only one satisfaction with respect thereto."

BANKRUPTCY AND RESTITUTION

1267

unjust enrichment that would result to the estate if satisfaction
should be allowed under both remedies." 52 Some interesting inferences
may be drawn from this brief proviso.
Before drawing inferences, however, it is best to comprehend more
clearly what is meant, or may be meant, by the expression "double
recovery"; and for that purpose an example will be in order. Section
60 of the Bankruptcy Act, concerning preferences, appears to yield
recoveries by the trustee that are cumulative, in a sense, when the
debtor has been refinancing his indebtedness prior to the bankruptcy.
A suitable case can be made of the facts in the well-known bankruptcy of the Garden City Grain and Seed Company.5 3 The nowbankrupt Company had been refinancing its indebtedness, and it
seems that three bank loans were involved in transactions within a
three-day period, less than four months before bankruptcy. Bank A
held the Company's note for 50,000 dollars at the outset. On December 17, when the note matured, it was paid under instructions
from a correspondent, bank B. That is, bank A debited the account
of bank B, thereby creating an indebtedness of the Company to the
latter. 54 On December 19, the Company borrowed 50,000 dollars
55
from bank C, and the proceeds of this loan were credited to bank B.
The trustee was able to establish that by December 17 the Company
was insolvent, and that bank A had reasonable cause to believe it.
Let it be supposed also (which would not be surprising) that bank B
had cause to believe the Company was insolvent. It follows from
these facts alone, presumably, that the trustee is entitled to recoveries
under section 60 aggregating 100,000 dollars, although the balance
sheet of the Company was unchanged in substance by the transactions
in question.
Professor MacLachlan has expressed doubt about this conclusion,
saying: "It is arguable that borrowing without security from one creditor to pay another is not preferential, for the substitution of creditors
does not affect the share of others." 5 He cited a district court decision
where the judge wrote:
52. 4 COLLIER 167.38, at 394. See also WFANSTEIN, THE BANKiUPTCY LAw OF 1938,
149 (1938). In Roberts v. Norrell, 212 F. Supp. 897 (N.D. Ala. 1963), the court
analyzed § 67d(3) and rejected the trustee's claim under it. He had previously compromised a "cumulative" claim under § 60. The court did not have to pass on the
defense based on that settlement. On the theory advanced here, proof of an improvident
settlement ought to limit the trustee's claim.
53. Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. dismissed,
350 U.S. 944 (1956). For background see First Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 217 F.2d 262
(10th Cir. 1954); Luther v. United States, 225 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1954).
54. The court observed that bank B "did not gratuitously pay the note" to bank A.
55. The referee remarked that the funds were "probably" used to reimburse bank B.
56. HANNA & MAcLAcHrAN, THE BANKR PTcY AcT 89 (8th ed. 1965).
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I find from the evidence before me that the payments made by the
Bankrupt and being questioned as preferential payments, were payments
made from other loans secured by the Bankrupt, and that such payments
did not in any way deplete or diminish the estate of the Bankrupt,57since
there was merely a substitution of one bank creditor for another.

On appeal, however, this decision was reversed.5 8
The leading cases are a pair of Second Circuit decisions in which
divergent conclusions were reached. The first one was Grubb v. General Contract Purchase Corp.,59 favoring the transferee. The opinion

was written, somewhat cryptically, by Learned Hand. The determinative fact seemed to be that the advances used to accomplish payment were made with an understanding-whether verbal or not-that
they would be applied as they were. "Obviously, it was not an ordinary
loan ... especial motives controlled it. . . . [Ilt is not necessary to
...
60 Conditions were attached to the
raise a trust upon the credit.
advance that restricted the borrower's general power of disposition
of the proceeds. In the second case, Smyth v. Kaufman,6 1 Augustus
Hand wrote the opinion (L. Hand joining), and expressed doubt
about the meaning of the earlier one. This time the court emphasized

control of the proceeds by the lender.
We believe the arrangement was such that Koplik [the borrower-bankrupt]
rather than Childs [the lender] designated the creditor to be paid and
controlled the application of the loan which it secured from its landlord.
The existence of this control determines whether the payments were preferential transfers by the bankrupt or were payments by a third-party who did
not make the loans generally but made them only on condition that a
particular creditor receive the proceeds....
[W]e think that the loans by Childs to Koplik were unconditional, that the
proceeds became part of the bankrupt's free assets, and that the employment
of the loan from Childs to extinguish the indebtedness to the executors
[defendant transferees] constituted a preferential transfer. Under these
57. Clower v. First State Bank, 227 F. Supp. 653, 655-56 (S.D. Tex. 1964). Cf.
Chiarovano v. Buttnick, 57 Wash. 2d 542, 358 P.2d 305 (1961). In another context
the idea has been picturesquely put as follows: "How the satisfaction of a debt by
incurring another of equal amount either decreases one's liabilities or increases his
assets can only be comprehended by the philosophic mind of a Micawber." Slater v.

Oriental Mills, 18 R.I. 352, 355, 27 At. 443, 444 (1893).
58. 343 F.2d 808 (5th Cir. 1965). Accord, In re Rubin, 1 F.2d 157, 159 (7th Cir.
1924): "The fact that Rubin borrowed the money with which to pay the bank the
$1,000 does not change the fact that it was a preference." The rather involved argument in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 96 F.2d 487 (6th Cir. 1938), tends toward the
same point.
59. 94 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1938).
60. Id. at 73. See also In re Zaferis Bros., 67 F.2d 140, 141 (9th Cir. 1933) ("merely
a transposition of credits . .. at no time... at the complete disposal of" debtor).

61. 114 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1940).
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circumstances, it does not matter that the money used to take up the
second check never actually came into the hands of Koplik. 62

Approaching these cases from the point of view of restitution, one
might think that principles of tracing would yield the right solution.
If Peter is robbed to pay Paul, other creditors of the robber may stand
to gain by Paul's satisfaction except to the extent that the funds can
be traced through the wrongdoer's hands; 3 and borrowing to effect
a voidable preference is something like a robbery. On that rather
loose reasoning, it might be argued that payment to a creditor is

non-preferential to the extent that the funds can be traced as proceeds of unsecured loans. That is decisively rejected, however, by

the holding in Smyth v. Kaufman and in like cases, if only by implication. (Conversely, there are certain indications that a payment, other-

wise non-preferential, is within section 60 if the funds are traced to
a lender who is effectively secured-a notion examined below.)
The justification for the Smyth case must be, in brief, that one
cannot, consistently with the bankruptcy scheme, attribute enrichment to creditors, in an ascertainable amount, resulting from an advance to the debtor. Considering them singly, some creditors may
have been misled into giving or continuing credit as a result, more

or less direct, of the advance. Some may have received payments,
reversible in bankruptcy, that the debtor was enabled to make by

the advance, although the funds advanced are not traceable to the
payments. The bankruptcy scheme does not permit an allowance
based on these circumstances, generally speaking. Considering the
creditors collectively, the advance may have staved off liquidation

for a space of time during which the debtor's position deteriorated,
thereby causing injury. Subvention of a financial derelict is conduct

not to be rewarded; hence a lender shows no equity against the4
estate simply by tracing his advances into the hands of the trustee.6

62. Id. at 42-43. Compare Chiarovano v. Buttnick, supra note 57. Naturally, the
"control" test is subject to manipulation to achieve a particular ideal. The rule has
been stated very broadly: "In cases where a third person makes a loan to a bankrupt
debtor specifically to enable him to satisfy the claim of a designated creditor, the proceeds never become part of the bankrupt's assets, and therefore no preference is created."
3 Cor mm f 60.26. But cf. Shapiro v. Royal Indem. Co., 224 F.2d 89 (3d Cir. 1955),
where an inclusive reading of the § 60 phrase, "the property of a debtor," served the
court's purpose to redress depletion of the estate. Compare Polish v. Johnson Serv. Co.,
333 F.2d 545 (3d Cir. 1964).
63. They stand to gain if the creditor, Paul, had security for his claim, or if it was
entitled to priority over the claims of other creditors, or if the creditor gave a discharge
for less than the amount of his claim. See 4 Scorr, ThusTs §§ 513, 513.1, 539 (2d ed.
1956). The victim of the robbery (or otherconscious wrongdoing) is subrogated to

the discharged claim.

REsTATE xEy, REsTrruTON

§ 207 (1937). For criticism of de-

partures from the principles of tracing see 4 Scoar, ,TiusTs § 540 (2d ed. 1956).
64. 4 CoLLnm ff 70.25. See Fitzgerald v. W. F. Sebel Co., 295 F.2d 654 (10th Cir.
1961); Marks v. Goodyear Rubber Sundries; 238 F.2d 533 (2d Cir. 1956). In each
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By parity of reasoning, a preferred creditor shows no equity by tracing
the funds he received back through the debtor to another source.
There is precedent for denying restitutionary relief to a lender be65
cause of the risks created by such conduct.
After all, diminution of the estate is not, in so many words, an
element in the section 60 definition of preference: "The law of preference, unlike the law of fraudulent conveyances, is directed not against
increasing the debtor's deficit, but against shifting an undue share
of the deficit onto the creditors not preferred."66 If the extent of the
deficit were a question in a section 60 case, it would be necessary
to reconstruct the debtor's affairs on the assumption that the transaction giving rise to payment had not occurred; and if that is feasible,
at least the Bankruptcy Act does not require it. So understood, the
statute deprives the transferee of any objection that avoidance would
enrich the estate unjustly. In the case of the three banks, previously
mentioned, it is not "unjust" to permit the trustee to recover 50,000
dollars from bank A and also from bank B, and the recoveries are not
"cumulative" in any pejorative sense. (It is assumed that the debtor
controlled the payments to these banks, so that the Smyth rule con-

trols. 67 )

Candor requires me to adtd that the foregoing extrapolation from
section 60 is very much at odds with certain decisions under another
part of that section. Ever since the present Bankruptcy Act was
enacted, section 60c has said:
If a creditor has been preferred, and afterward in good faith gives the
debtor further credit without security of any kind for property which becomes a part of the debtor's estate, the amount of such new credit remain-

ing unpaid at the time of the adjudication in bankruptcy may be set off
against the amount which would otherwise be recoverable from him. 68

Evidently that provision was designed to conform the law of preferences, in a measure, to a concept of restitution: the set-off is a partial
barrier to unjust enrichment of the estate. Now, it might have been
interpreted narrowly, in a spirit of caution about enrichment of
case the trustee was permitted to recover merchandise sold to the bankrupt on credit,
and returned to the seller. As to the hostility of bankruptcy to implied, and other,
trusts, see In re Lord's Inc., 356 F.2d! 456 (7th Cir. 1965).
65. A case wherein subrogation to a discharged security interest was otherwise appropriate, but was denied because a junior interest might have been foreclosed more
seasonably if the claimant had kept his purse strings tied: Western United Dairy Co. v.
Continental Mortgage Co., 28 III. App.2d 132, 170 N.E.2d 650 (1960). Compare
Compania Anonima Venezolana De Navegacion v. A. J. Perez Export Co., 303 F.2d
692, 698 (5th Cir. 1962): "The loss was occasioned wholly and solely by the voluntary
act of the Agent in gratuitously extending credit .... "
66. MA cLAcEr.AN § 256, at 294. But see 3 CoLLiER f1 60.20.

67 But see note 62 supra.
68. Bankruptcy Act § 60c, 52 Stat. 870 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96c (1964).
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creditors. The phrase "in good faith" might have been thought to
mean, "without knowledge that a preference had been given"; and
"which becomes a part of the debtor's estate" might have been regarded as a requirement that the creditor trace the funds ("property")
advanced into the hands of the bankruptcy court. On the contrary,
in Kaufman v. Tredway 9 the Supreme Court said that the good faith
requirement was satisfied if the creditor let the debtor have the money
or property "for some honest purpose," and held that tracing was not
required. "If the creditor has acted in good faith, extended credit
without security, and the money or property has actually passed into
the debtor's possession, why should anything more be requred?" 0
This decision dates from 1904, long before the Court became a literalist about section 60, and if the question were new today one would
not expect such generosity toward the transferee.
Taking their cue from Kaufman v. Tredway, some lesser federal
courts have been even more generous. Without going into detail, we
may note the creative spirit at work in the following passage:
The right of offset as against the recovery of a preference given by
section 60c is not exclusive. In any case in which the result of allowing
the offset does not disturb, but promotes, equality of distribution among
creditors of the same class, it is proper; and the effect of allowing it, in
this respect, is to be determined by the entire transaction between the

creditor and the bankrupt. 7'

Evidently the court that is quoted was prepared to test the trustee's
powers against its own notions of unjust enrichment. It would be
foolhardy to assert, or to deny, that the same spirit will carry over
into the situation we have described as a "substitution of creditors."
The range of situations in which a set-off obtains against the trustee
is still astonishingly ill-defined; 72 we can only say that when (or if
ever) it is authoritatively staked out, the relation between the trustee's
avoiding powers and principles of restitution generally will come into
new and clearer focus.
69. 195 U.S. 271 (1904).
70. Id. at 275.
71. Walker v. Wilkinson, 296 Fed. 850, 853 (5th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 265 U.S.

596 (1924).

72. The case last noted indicates that the requirement that credit be given afterwardafter the preference-is not essential to the set-off. See also Dinkelspiel v. Weaver, 116
F. Supp. 455 (W.D. Ark. 1953). Thbre is also authority dispensing with the statutory
requirement that the new credit remain unpaid at the time of the adjudication. In re
Ace Fruit & Produce Co., 49 F. Supp. 986 (S.D.N.Y. 1943). These decisions. are dubious, however. As indicating that the matter is not one for the application of general
equities, see Grandison v. Nat'1 Bank of, Commerce, supra note 49,. at 810: "[T]he right
to offset a new credit given in good faith is restricted to the amount of the new credit
remaining unpaid at the time of the adjudication." For general discussion see 3 COLLmR
f"60.67; MAcLAcHLAN § 274.
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Allowing for all possible doubts, we shall do well to proceed on
the assumption that Smyth v. Kaufman73 is a sound starting point
for solving a substitution-of-creditors problem, and that Grubb v.
General Contract Purchase Corp.74 illustrates a settled counter-principle. The Grubb case, it will be recalled, supports the proposition
that it is not preferential to borrow without security from one creditor
to pay another if the new lender controls the application of his advances to the old debt by appropriate conditions. The estate would
be unjustly enriched if the trustee were to avoid the payment. Is
this judgment affected if we assume that the new lender also takes
security for his loan? Why should it be?-except, of course, in estimating the probabilities that the borrower's power of disposition was
in fact restricted. On principle, one would think that a lender taking
security might so condition and control his advances that the bor75
rower's application of them to a debt comes within the Grubb rule.

It has been held, however, that the rule of the Grubb case does not
apply to secured borrowings. That was one of the holdings in Stone
v. Allied Clothing Corp.,6 a New Jersey case growing out of the
bankruptcy of Tip Top Tailors, Inc. Tip Top was controlled by a firm
that the court called "Limited," and Limited received a pledge of
wooden goods from Tip Top shortly before bankruptcy to secure contemporaneous advances of nearly 20,000 dollars. Of this amount, some
9,000 dollars was paid by Limited directly to an unsecured creditor,
"Dominion." Reasoning from section 67d(3) of the Bankruptcy Act,
on preference-enabling transfers, the court concluded that "the lien
on the woolens to the extent of the payment to Dominion must be set
aside.""' As to the bulk of the advances, however, the pledge was held
good, because they were applied to the claim of a creditor, "Allied,"
who was thought by the parties to have a previous security interest of
its own. In fact it did not, and the court held that the payment to
Allied effected a voidable preference. "The money which was paid was
the consideration for the pledge, and must be considered assets of the
8
debtor Tip Top, even though Limited controlled the transaction.""
73. Supra note 61.

74. Supra note 59.
75. If he takes both of these precautions, it is arguable that the situation should be
treated in the same way as if he had gone surety for an antecedent obligation of the
debtor, taking a contemporaneous security interest. In other words, the position taken
in the text is perhaps inconsistent with the holding in Aulick v. Largent, supra note 39.
For comment on that case, see text accompanying note 39 supra. Even more clearly,
the extension of the Auliclk rule in Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Woodson, supra note 46,
seems to trench on the doctrine of the Grubb case. Aulick is presented as an exception
to that doctrine in CouNT-YmAN,

CASEs ONJDEBTOR AND Cimmnron 513 (1964).

76. 140 N.J. Eq. 224, 54 A.2d 625 (Ch. 1947).
77. Id. at 237, 54 A.2d at 634.
78. Id. at 238, 54 A.2d at 635 (Emphasis added.) Compare First Nat'l Bank v.
62 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1932), where the court said it was "not supposable" that money
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Similarly, the payment to Dominion was "avoided": "This money [advanced by Limited] was assets of Tip Top, since the pledge was good
79
as against Tip Top, though not as against the trustee."
On the latter point the Stone case is contradicted by a district court
decision, In re Loring,80 which rejected a trustee's petition based upon
section 60. It appeared that the defendant, creditor A, had been paid
by check received from creditor B, and that the check represented
part of the proceeds of a contemporaneous loan secured by a chattel
mortgage. The court referred to an agreement by B to "take over'
the debt to A. "The payment to [A] was made in compliance with
that agreement. The bankrupt never had possession of the proceeds
of the note, and the payment did not result in any diminution of
the bankrupt's estate."81 However, it also appeared that the mortgage
was "invalid," for want of proper recording, and the court said: "If
the mortgage had been upheld as a valid prior lien upon the assets
of the bankrupt, a different conclusion might follow .... ,,aI submit
that no different conclusion should follow.
By ruling against both the pledge to Limited (in part) and the
payment to Dominion, the New Jersey court involved itself in a
dilemma: where should the trustee's satisfaction come from? This
is the sort of problem to which the general law of restitution can
make a contribution, though all proper regard must be had for the
Bankruptcy Act. The dilemma is built into the act, I hasten to say,
even if the Stone case was not one in which it had to be faced.8 The
solution given there is at least a starting point. We have seen that the
trustee successfully challenged the payment to Dominion as a preference, and to the same extent upset the pledge under section 67d(3).
That section has been described aboveas with special reference to the
advanced on the strength of a chattel mortgage was put in the borrower's hands as
general assets.
79. Stone v. Allied Clothing Corp., supra note 76, at 238, 54 A.2d at 635 (Emphasis
added.) Literally speaking, if the court had followed the rule of the Grubb case, as
advocated here, it could not have held that the pledge to Limited was in any part
voidable; for prior to 1952, § 67d(3) required that there be an intent to effect a
voidable preference, and there could have been no such intent in a transaction controlled
by the transferee. This logical impasse was broken by the 1952 amendment of § 67d(3),
which now requires only the intent to enable a creditor "to obtain a greater percentage
of his debt than some other creditor of the same class." Bankruptcy Act § 67d(3), as
amended, ch. 579, 66 Stat. 428 (1952), 11 U.S.C. § 107d(3)(1964).
80. 30 F. Supp. 758 (D. Mass. 1939). Cf. Crosby v. Packer, 22 F.2d 611 (1st Cir.
1927).
81. In re Loring, id. at 759-60.
82. Id. at 760.
83. For cumulative remedies to exist under § 67d(3), one need only suppose that
Limited took its pledge in circumstances described in the section, but permitted Tip
Top to control the application of the proceeds ultimately (and preferentially) paid to
Dominion.
84. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
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provision that where the trustee has cumulative remedies under it and
under section 60-as in Stone-he "shall be entitled to only one satisfaction with respect thereto." Recognizing this limitation, the court was
naturally faced with back-biting controversy between the two transferees, Limited and Dominion. Each contended that the loss should
ultimately fall on the other. 5 Initially, the court placed the loss on
Limited: "The overriding interest of the estate requires that the
trustee take the sum in question from the fund at hand [the court
had in hand the proceeds of the pledged property, which had been
sold], rather than attempt to collect it from Dominion."86 Then it
proceeded to ask: "Should Dominion be required to share the
burden?" The discussion of this question was somewhat obscure, and
the court gave only a partial answer. It said that Limited was "entitled to subrogation to any claim of Dominion against the estate, as
a general creditor, up to the sum of $9,150 . .

.

. Whether or not

Dominion has
any valid claim is a question which does not concern
7
Chancery."
The easiest way to handle a dilemma is not to face it. The New
Jersey court is to be praised for not taking the easy way in the
Stone case. It was at least justified in trying to solve its difficulty
with the doctrine of subrogation, a "powerful and pervasive idea." 88
One use of this doctrine is to dislodge unprincipled power from private hands, fulfilling one of the law's most urgent duties. If restitutionary relief were not available when a bankruptcy trustee exercises
one of his cumulative remedies, he would be empowered to impose
a loss upon either of two transferees at his whim. It is a function of
subrogation to counter such power, and to suppress the "interesting
and unwholesome opportunities for collusion" 9 that it creates. The
trustee's choice of a remedy must not foreclose a claim in restitution
85. "Counsel on the one side press upon me that Limited was trying to rescue Tip
Top, while Dominion was ruthlessly driving it into bankruptcy. And on the opposite
side, that Limited voluntarily bought off Dominion in hope of saving its own investment
in its subsidiary." Stone v. Allied Clothing Corp., supra note 76, at 239, 54 A.2d at 635.
86. Ibid.
87. Ibid. See also Cunningham v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 4 F.2d 25, 42 (1st Cir.
1925) (dissenting opinion), cert denied, 268 U.S. 691 (1925).
88. FARNswonrTH & HoNNoLD, CASES ON COMMERCIAL LA-W 933 (1965); HONNOLD,
CASES

ON SALES & SALES FINANCING

642 (2d ed. 1962).

89. Farnsworth, op. cit. supra note 88, at 934; Honnold, op. cit. supra note 88, at 643.
Professor Honnold has described this function as vividly as anyone, in connection with a
surety's right of subrogation. He describes a mortgagee (C) who has a right against
an accommodation party (S), and explains that S is subrogated to the mortgage if C
requires him to satisfy the debt. He points out that C might have foreclosed the mortgage, notwithstanding any objection by D's other creditors. Subrogation takes the sting
out of C's arbitrary power. "If C's alternative choice to force payment from S should
give the creditors the benefit of the mortgage, interesting and unwholesome opportunities for collusion could develop. Indeed, one with a lively imagination could visualize
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in favor of his victim: it would be a scandal indeed to allow an arbitrary choice to an official under court supervision. If he pursues
both remedies at once, as in Stone, the court in which he does so
ought to entertain the restitutionary claim. Naturally, the claim
should fail if it is found that the Bankruptcy Act authorizes cumulative recoveries; non-bankruptcy courts are perfectly competent to
apply the act to that extent. If it exists, the right to restitutionary
relief may or may not be found in the law of bankruptcy: the point
is that in a proper case it must be found somewhere.
The question remains, Did the court apply subrogation properly
in the Stone case? In the Restatement of Restitution, subrogation is
given as a remedy, analogous to a constructive trust, designed to prevent unjust enrichment of an obligor 90 -and, of course, his creditors.
In an appropriate case, the unjust enrichment of a bankruptcy estate
ought certainly to be fended off by subrogating a person who has
been in some way victimized to the position of a former creditor who
has been paid out of his property. Perhaps that is what the court
thought it was doing in Stone, when it subrogated Limited to Dominion's claim, but when it spoke of "sharing the burden" it did not
seem to have in mind enrichment of the estate. What the court
had set itself to do was to adjust "the equities between the defendants Dominion and Limited,"91 having ruled that they were both
obligors of the estate. Although they were at least potential obligees
of the estate, as "creditors," they were also obligors in their capacity
as defendants and recipients of voidable transfers. Possibly the court
failed to attend sufficiently to this dual role in applying the remedy
of subrogation.
If we may cast the trustee, or estate, as a "creditor," and the defendants as obligors, the possibility of subrogation emerges in another
forn-one that the court did not consider. "A person who unofficiously
fully performs an obligation which should be performed by another
is ordinarily entitled, in addition to an action at law for restitution,
to be subrogated to the position of the creditor."92 This suggests,
an auction held by C, with S and D's creditors bidding against each other for C's
decision, the value of which would approximate the value of the mortgage." Ibid.
Similarly, in the Stone case, if the trustee's choice of remedies should give the
benefit of satisfaction to one creditor rather than another, "interesting and unwholesome
opportunities for collusion could develop." See also Campbell, Non-Consensual
Suretyship, 45 YALE LJ.69 (1935).
90. RESTATEMENT, RF-STITUTION § 162 (1937).
91. Stone v. Allied Clothing Corp., supra note 76, at 239, 54 A.2d at 635.
92. RESTATEMENT, RESTrrUTION § 76, comment g (1937). There is a cross-reference
here to § 162, but it is plain that the two sorts of subrogation are different. Subrogation
to a bankruptcy claim, as to a secured position, has its impact on other creditors, or
another secured party, preventing their unjust enrichment-and ordinarily subrogation
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as applied to the Stone case, that Limited be subrogated to the trustee's power of avoiding the preference to Dominion-that the court
chose the wrong subrogee. More simply, it suggests that Limited

was entitled to indemnity from Dominion, as having "discharged a
duty which is owed by him but which as between himself and another
should have been discharged by the other .... ."91
In my view, the error of the court was in requiring that Dominion
share the burden, rather than bear it. That is to say, as between two
transferees against whom the trustee has cumulative remedies under
section 67d(3), the one from whom the "one satisfaction" for the
estate ought to come is the one who was preferred. This proposition
is offered as a deduction both from the scheme of the Bankruptcy
Act and from principles of restitution; hence it cannot be said with
assurance whether it is part of the proper law of bankruptcy or not.
In either case, upon the facts of Stone it was pretty plainly within the
competence of the New Jersey court to apply it.94 Other commentators
to a simple, unsecured claim has (or should have) no utility. By contrast, subrogation
to a trustee's avoiding power redresses unjust enrichment of the target of his power,
and is an "equitable" alternative to a right of indemnity. Subrogation of this genre,
quite unlike the first, works only if the bankrupt's transfer or obligation is defeasible.
Nota bene, the distinction is not suitably indicated by the terms "legal" and "conventional" subrogation. Compare United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Maryland Cps. Co.,
186 Kan. 637, 352 P.2d 70 (1960), with Martin v. Hickenlooper, 90 Utah 150, 59
P.2d 1139 (1936).
93. REsTATEMETrr, REsTrUTr oN § 76 (1937). Obviously, the problem of restitution
presented when a preference-enabling transfer is made is different from the problem
arising when a preference-enabling obligation is incurred. The Stone case is in the
former category inasmuch as Limited made a secured loan (upon a pledge). Section
67d(3) declares both transfer and obligation to be voidable. Foolishly, it has been
assumed that an indebtedness is voided by the section, whether or not it is fully
secured. See Note, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. 604 (1949). What should be understood is that
avoiding the transfer (pledge), while recognizing the indebtedness, fully compensates
the estate, except to the extent that the collateral is inadequate. To that extent,
the obligation is voided.
If L lends D $100 without security, knowing what must be known to make the
obligation fraudulent under § 67d(3), and D pays it preferentially to C, the trustee
may or may not be able to recapture the payment under § 60b. If he may, he has
cumulative remedies. Now, it may not be entirely clear what "one satisfaction" means
with respect to a remedy like avoidance of an obligation, but the most natural supposition is that the trustee may not both disavow L's claim and recover from C. If
he chooses the former course, and does not pursue C, then according to the views
expressed here, C is unjustly enriched and L should have a restitutionary right against
him. The measure of it might be (for a starter) the dividend on a $100 claim.
94. If the trustee had brought his action against one of the transferees alone, the
competence of the court to ascertain his possible remedies against others might be
doubted. See Eau Claire Nat'l Bank v. Jackman, 204 U.S. 522 (1907); 2 COLLIEM ff
23.19. Problems of jurisdiction are beyond the scope of this paper. See generally
Mussman & Riesenfeld, Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy, 13 LAw & CONTENP. PnoD. 88
(1948). If inter-creditor restitution were granted in a proceeding to which the trustee
is not a party, the remedy that suggests itself is a judgment for the loan proceeds that
were preferentially paid over, less the dividends that the payee would have received in
bankruptcy if the payment had not been made. But see Comment, 68 HAuv. L. REv.
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have both praised and rebuked the court for this portion of its opinion,
but without touching the nerve of the matter. It is "obiter," said
Professor Corker, "because the determination of who has a provable
claim is for the bankruptcy court."95 His remark does not reach the
more interesting question whether the equities between Limited and

Dominion are to be assessed by reference to state law or bankruptcy
law. On the merits, the court's use of subrogation has been applauded,
though not with abandon, and the law reviews overlooked the fact
that it misfired.9
The way in which a bankruptcy court might implement one creditor's restitutionary claim against another is shown in Aulick v. Largent, 7 the Fourth Circuit case presented earlier. Mrs. Aulick, a

preferred creditor, had obtained a judgment and satisfaction against
Lemley, an indorser for the bankrupt, in the amount of 10,700 dollars,

plus court costs and attorney fees. The bankruptcy court ordered
Lemley to restore to the trustee a stock certificate pledged to him

by the bankrupt to procure his indorsement-although Lemley had
not been preferred. Then the court impressed a trust (in effect)
on the avails of the trustee's action against Mrs. Aulick, giving judg1271 (1955). A simpler procedure might be to award the plaintiff the whole amount
traced to the defendant, conditioned upon an assignment to the latter of the plaintiff's
claim against the estate. In that form, of course, the relief amounts to subrogation
to the trustee's power of avoiding the preference. There are difficulties, of course, in the
path of either of these remedies: difficulties of calculation and difficulties having to do
with bankruptcy jurisdiction. See 3 CorimER fr 60.57(2). However, they are no worse
(to say the least) than the difficulties encountered in granting the relief fashioned in
the Stone case. See note 96 infra.
95. Corker, Hazards of Doing Business with an Insolvent: The Dean v. Davis
Amendment in the Chandler Act, 1 STAN. L. RIv. 189, 214 (1949). See also 4
CoLLmR f 67.38 at 395 n.37: "The New Jersey court's discussion concerned matters
properly cognizable in a bankruptcy court."
96. The result has been termed "desirable and consistent with the statutory mandate
.
" Note, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. 604, 607 (1949). The writer suggests that some such
phrase as "equitable substitution be used in lieu of "subrogation," because of limitations commonly placed on the latter doctrine. No difficulty ought to be anticipated in
respect of the name, certainly if the controlling principles are those derived from the
Bankruptcy Act. See also Comment, 40 MINN. L. REv. 499, 501 (1956). The discussion in Collier is at least not disapproving. See 4 COLLMR f 67.38.
At best, the relief granted to Limited could not exceed Dominion's share in the
estate. But Dominion's claim was apparently a nonesuch, for the obvious reason that
the trustee had his "one satisfaction" in the case at hand. Even if Limited was subrogated to a claim larger than zero, its reimbursement was only the dividends on the claim
-an amount virtually arbitrary in relation to the controvery between them.
Subrogation to the preferred creditor's claim encounters an obstacle in § 57g of the
Act (11 U.S.C. § 93g), making the claims of recipients of voidable preferences nonallowable. The obstacle might be gotten over, as suggested in Corker, supra note 95,
at 214 and 4 CoLL=r
ff 67.38 at 393, n.31. Clearing that hurdle, however, does not
automatically adjust the interests of the parties equitably-and if it is not cleared,
oppressive conduct by the trustee is permitted, as shown in Corker, supra note 95,
at 214 n.79.
97. See text accompanying note 39 supra.
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ment against her, for the benefit of Lemley, in the amount of 10,700
dollars. Evidently the court conceived that it had plastic power
to fashion a remedy for the needs of the whole situation, so that there
should be no unjust enrichment of the estate, nor of Lemley, nor of
Mrs. Aulick 8
As a test of the relation between preference law and section 67d (3),
let us suppose a variation on the Stone case-and for simplicity's sake
we shall take the Uniform Commercial Code as applicable law. Let
us say that Limited never took possession of the "pledged" collateral,
and failed to file a financing statement covering its security interest.
The consequence is (under article 9 of the Code) that a subsequent
lien obtained by legal proceedings upon the collateral, or the rights
of a subsequent bona fide purchaser, would be superior to those of
Limited 9 The security interest remains (in both senses) unperfected at the time of bankruptcy. On these facts the transfer (pledge)
"shal be deemed to have been made immediately before the filing of
the petition."100 The perfection clauses of the Bankruptcy Act tend
to make transfers voidable by relating them forward to a time when
the elements of voidability may readily be established. Since the
payment to Dominion is voidable as a preference (it is assumed),
we may summarize the position of the trustee in this case, with only
the barest hesitation, as follows: (1) He has cumulative remedies
against Dominion and Limited under section 60, upon showing that
"immediately" before bankruptcy Limited had reasonable cause to
98. The court entertained the idea of restoring to the surety the whole amount he
had paid on the contract-under legal compulsion-but rejected it on the following
significant ground: "Equitable considerations should not be disregarded. . . . Since the
costs and attorney fees incurred in the state court litigation were occasioned by Lemley's
unwarranted and indefensible refusal to discharge his liability as an endorser, it is
inequitable that Mrs. Aulick be required to refund to Lemley, by payment to and
through the trustee, such costs and fees." Aulick v. Largent, 295 F.2d 41, 52 (4th Cir.
1961). (In the case as stated here, recoveries of interest are disregarded; and so is the
circumstance, not now pertinent, that the pledge to Lemley was in minor part undoubtedly preferential.)
Yet the court expressed an odd limitation on its wide-ranging decree: it purported
to leave the way open to a further action by Mrs. Aulick against Lemley. But what
of merger by judgment? Would her action be one based on unjust enrichment
caused by the bankruptcy court? The remark must signify something about bankruptcy
jurisdiction; but it is hard to know what. Compare in that aspect, In re Wyse, 340
F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1965); see Coogan, Kripke & Weiss, The Outer Fringes of Article 9,
79 HAv. L. REv. 229, 251-52 (1965).
In a subsequent preference case, Virginia Nat'l Bank v. Woodson, 329 F.2d 836 (4th
Cir. 1964), the court "followed" its decision in Aulick, and granted recovery for the
trustee in the lesser of two sums: the amount paid to the creditor, or "what the
bankrupt's estate has lost." In framing decrees in these cases the Fourth Circuit has
manifested a restitutionary approach to the law of preferences much more clearly than
the Bankruptcy Act does. Compare note 42 supra.
99. UNWORMir COMMUCL&L CODE § 9-301.
100. Bankruptcy Act, §§ 60a(2), 67d(5), 52 Stat. 870, 878 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §§
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believe that the debtor was insolvent. 1 1 (2) He has cumulative
remedies under section 67d(3) upon showing that Limited knew
what its advances were to be used for, and that Limited knew "immediately" before bankruptcy that insolvency proceedings were in
10 2
contemplation.
May the trustee have cumulative recoveries in either situation?
We know that under section 67d(3) he is "entitled to only one satisfaction with respect to" his cumulative remedies. We have surmised,
however, that he may have cumulative recoveries under section 60.
On the face of it, this position does not seem to make much sense.
In effect, we would be saying that if the trustee fights his way up
the steeper hill of section 67d(3), the advantage to the estate is
less than if he strolls up the gentler slope of section 60. On the other
hand, there is no actual inconsistency. If the proviso about "one
satisfaction" is in the right place in the act, it simply means that the
trustee may not add to all his recoveries under section 60-possibly
multiple ones, enriching the estate-an additional recovery for a
preference-enabling transfer. In one important respect the equities
of a transferee who can be challenged under section 67d(3) are
superior to those of a preferred creditor: he has given consideration
either at the time of or after the transfer, by hypothesis ("the consideration obtained for such transfer"). By contrast, a transfer cannot be preferential unless it is-or is at least "deemed"-one "for or on
account of an antecedent debt." Hence there is some reason to regard
the preference-enabling transfer with less alarm than the preference
itself; the evil aimed at by section 67d(3) is ancillary to the main
one. The use of the word "fraudulent" in that section, and the relatively pallid word "preference" in section 60, tends to distort a clear
10 3
view of the designed relation between the sections.
96a(2), 107d(5)- (1964).

"Such petition" is the wording of the latter section.

101. Bankruptcy Act, § 60b, 52 Stat. 870. (1938), 11 U.S.C. -§ 96b (1964); quoted in
note 42 supra. Limited's security interest would almost surely be ousted by §§ 70c
and 70e (11 U.S.C. §§ 110c, e) as well as by § 60. This thought reinforces the view
that its validity has nothing to do with the preference issue respecting the payment
to Dominion.

102. See 4 COLLIER f1 67.40. In re Loring, supra note 80, would be a similar case
if the mortgagee had had such knowledge. It directed-the application of the proceeds
to a trade creditor-indeed, sent its own check.
103. See Marsh v. Walters, 220 Fed. 805, 808 (6th Cir. 1915). See also Corker,
supra note 95, at 215: "[T]he judicial instinct seems to be sound in preferring that the

burden be shifted where possible from the transferee, to the preferred creditor." But
as to the viciousness of a fraudulent, as opposed to a preferential, conveyance, see Van
Iderstine v. National Discount Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1913).

In 4 COLLIER ff 67.38 the view is expressed that a transferee would have a defense
against a § 67d(3) attack if he could show that the consideration he gave was not

used as intended-preferentially-but was still in the-hands of .the bankrupt at the
date of bankruptcy, and so came into the estate. This is consistent with the view of
the section taken here: that it is ancillary in character. In connection with the 1952
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The possibilities of inter-creditor restitution, occasioned by bankruptcy, should be evaluated in light of transfers after the date of
bankruptcy (filing of the petition) as well as before. To take a simple
case, suppose that after a petition is filed the debtor withdraws funds
on deposit in his bank and applies them to the payment of a trade
creditor. And let it be supposed that under section 70 of the act
the trustee has rights of recovery against both the payor and the
payee. If he requires the bank to restore the bankrupt's account to
its previous condition, the stage is set for a restitutionary claim against
the creditor. The claim could be strengthened, as desired, by assuming various degrees of good faith and knowledge on the part of the
bank and the trade creditor.
It may be that such a claim would have to be "pitched upon"
non-bankruptcy law, or it may be that the claim would be controlled
by emanations from the Bankruptcy Act; the question is an open
one. The same uncertainty exists as in the situation previously hypothesized, where a restitutionary claim is occasioned by section 67d(3)
of the act. In the present situation, the uncertainty runs even deeper,
10 4
for it is not clear that the trustee is confined to "one satisfaction";
and if he is, there is more room for doubt whether the payor or the
payee should be the one ultimately accountable. If the payor bank
asserted, as against the estate, a right of subrogation to the discharged
claim of the trade creditor, it might be met with various inferences,
drawn from the Bankruptcy Act, that the estate is not unjustly enriched by a "double recovery." There is a basis for such an inference
in section 63b of the act;105 and it is a notable fact that section 70
amendment of § 67d(3), the relation between it and § 60 was suggested in the term
"auxiliary transaction." H.R. REP. No. 2320, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 15 (1952).
Professor Corker thought there would be no such defense, it seems. See Corker, supra
note 95, at 213.
104. That is, it may be that the trustee is entitled to have the payment to the
creditor reversed and the bankrupt's account restored, while recognizing only one claim
against the estate.
105. Bankruptcy Act § 63b, 52 Stat. 873 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 103b (1964). If the
proceeds of a pre-bankruptcy loan, fraudulently induced by security in collateral that
the borrower bad no power to encumber, were applied to satisfy a secured claim, the
lender would have either a provable claim of his own or a secured position via subrogation-depending upon a complex of bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy rules. It has been
said that a comparable (post-bankruptcy) transaction between a lender and a bankrupt
gives the lender at least an offsetting credit against the trustee when he claims the
collaetral-gives him in effect a provable claim. Comment, 68 HAnv. L. tlv. 1271
(1955). But see text accompanying note 18 supra; 3 COLLmrE ff 63.34.
Varying the facts supposed in the text, suppose that the payor bank had misguidedly
honored a "no-account" check, thereby acquiring a claim against the bankrupt, An
inference from § 63b is, that if it did so after the prescribed interval it would not
have a provable claim. To give it one by subrogation to the (paid) claim of another
creditor would circumvent the Act. (The Comment cited above suggests otherwise, as
shown in discussion of the case cited at note 106 infra, as first characterized. See also
Comment, 40 MnNi. L. REv. 499 (1956).) Arguably it follows from this that the
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does not contain a "one satisfaction" limitation on the trustee's rights
and powers. The possibility of inferring such a limitation was raised
in one well-known case, Lake v. New York Life Insurance Co.,1' 6 but
the court's discussion was entirely inconclusive. The bankrupt had
fraudulently obtained life insurance policy loans, and used the proceeds partly "to satisfy certain debts . . . and thereby the estate was
benefited." When the trustee sued the companies for the cash surrender value of the policies, they claimed credits based on the satisfaction of debts. The issue was not ruled upon, however.
[T]he evidence did not show which of the debts were entitled to priority
and which were claims of general creditors and consequently additional
evidence would be required if it should become necessary to determine
the
07
legal effect of the use of the money in the manner indicated.'

Cumulative remedies under section 70 were asserted by a trustee
in an important case that is still sub judice at the time of this writing: Bank of Matin v. England.'0 8 Checks drawn by the bankrupt
were presented to the bank six days after the filing of a voluntary

petition, and it paid them without knowledge of the petition. The
checks had been given to a creditor, shortly before bankruptcy, in
payment of an account. The trustee sought a recovery in the amount
of the checks against the payee, Eureka Fisheries, and against the

bank, in the alternative. The referee ruled that the payee and the
bank were jointly liable to the trustee for the amount he sought. (On
review and appeal the ruling was sustained, insofar as the bank was
concerned. Certiorari has been granted.) Two questions may be
asked about the situation, neither of which has been adjudicated.
payor bank is not to be subrogated even if it was (as supposed in the text) in funds.
But possibly subrogation is excluded as a remedy for persons so misguided as to
give credit to the bankrupt, and not as to those paying over to him by error. Cf.
Kohn v. Myers, 356 F.2d 353 (2d Cir. 1959), stated in the text accompanying note 22
supra. The Comment mentioned above differentiates the two situations in the two
characterizations of the case in hand (the second one seems correct).
106. 218 F.2d 394 (4th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955). In Comment, 68 HAnv. L. REv. 1271 (1955), the case is interpreted as assuring the defendants
of a credit, contrary to the view here expressed that it was inconclusive. The student
writer says that "the trustee should not be allowed to realize an amount exceeding the
cash surrender value of the policies by virtue of having two remedies. Cf. Bankruptcy
Act § 67d(3) ....
Id. at 1272. The case is also commented on in 40 MiNN. L. lEv.
499 (1956). Compare May v. Henderson, 268 U.S. 111 (1925).
107. Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra note 106, at 401. See also Feldmann v.
Capitol Piece Dye Works, Inc., 293 F.2d 889 (2d Cir. 1961), where the court held a
bank accountable to the trustee for post-bankruptcy withdrawals, and added: "We do
not however pass upon the right of the bank to invoke any remedies which it may consider to be available to recover that portion of the funds, represented by the judgment
to be entered, which have been used in the payment of the bankrupt's legitimate
obligations." Id. at 892.
108. 352 F.2d 186 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 383 U.S. 906 (1966). As to the
bank's liability, see COUNTRYMAN, CASES ON DEBTOR AND CREDITOR 414 n.3 (1964).
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First, might the trustee have had cumulative recoveries against the
payee and the bank, if he had been more grasping? Second, if the
trustee has cumulative remedies against the payee and the bank,
but is content with one recovery (or has to be), who should bear
the ultimate loss?
If cumulative recoveries are allowed in the Bank of Main case, it
appears that the estate would be enriched by the amount of the
checks. (The bank would not acquire a provable claim of its own,
apparently, upon restoring the debtor's account. 10 9 ) If a trustee were
to seek such an effect on facts like these, it is submitted, his grasp
would exceed his reach. The bankruptcy court could and should find
a way to frustrate such an outrageous maneuver: subrogation of the
bank to the trustee's power of avoiding the payment has been thought
of; 110 and a constructive trust comes to mind. In the Bank of Marin
case the court made it clear that no problem of cumulative recoveries
was before it:
We express no opinion as to whether the bank will, in fact, have to
pay any part of these checks. As noted above, the order ran against the
bank and Eureka Fisheries jointly, and Eureka Fisheries has paid the trustee
the full amount of the checks in question. The rights as between the bank
and Eureka Fisheries have yet to be determined."'

Thus the second question is reached: Is there a rule of law-bankruptcy or other-that determines the ultimate incidence of loss, as
between the two persons liable to the trustee? If there is such a
rule, it is obviously restitutionary in character. Having paid the trustee, Eureka Fisheries filed with the bankruptcy court, and served on
109. Because, in general, only debts of the bankrupt existing at the date of bankruptcy give rise to provable claims; and see note 105 supra. See also IMAcLACIILAN

§ 140.
110. Comment, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1271 (1955). Also: "The bankruptcy court might
grant a petition of the companies to compel the trustee to seek recovery from the
creditors, thereby releasing the companies from at least part of their liability." Id. at
1272.
If cumulative recoveries are objectionable in this situation, it may be asked, why
are they not equally so in the case of a "substitution of creditors"? (See text accompanying note 51 supra.) A short answer to this question would be that post-bankruptcy
transactions are placed by the act in a world apart from pre-bankruptcy transactions.
A full answer would require an essay in itself. Two points only can be noticed here,
by way of comparing the creditor paid before bankruptcy and the one paid thereafter.
First, the payment before bankruptcy is irreversible (so far as § 60 is concerned) if
the creditor did not have, "at the time when the transfer is made, reasonable cause
to believe that the debtor is insolvent." By contrast, the post-bankruptcy transferee
may be required to disgorge without a showing of any such involvement in the debtor's
affairs. Second, insofar as outstanding credit serves as an inducing cause for third parties
to confide in the debtor, credit given for a period before bankruptcy may sensibly be
regarded as a greater commercial threat than credit outstanding after a petition is
filed.
111. Bank of Main v. England, supra note 108, at 193 n.12.
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the bank, a demand for contribution. If the bank had made such a
payment to the trustee, it might well have demanded contribution
from Eureka Fisheries, and perhaps would have demanded reimbursement of the entire payment.1 2 Restitutionary relief of some sort
must be made available to one or the other of the judgment debtors
upon satisfying the trustee, for the reason already indicated: the
necessity of suppressing an unprincipled allocation of loss by the
trustee." 3 An appropriate one, it seems, would be to indemnify the
bank (if it had paid the judgment) to the extent of the trade creditor's
net liability to the estate" 4-and conversely, to deny contribution in
favor of the creditor. A right of contribution hardly seems to fit the
case, since the equities are not equal." 5 The bank was in fact a debtor
of the bankrupt, never having given him credit so far as appears.
This circumstance, and the commercial advantage in promoting honor
of checks, argue for the rule advanced. An argument to the contrary
might be founded on the doctrine of bona fide purchase, however.
The resolution of these questions cannot be based directly upon
section 67d(3)116 of the act. It does not apply to the Bank of Matin
situation because the bankruptcy petition was filed before the checks
were presented. But might not the idea of the section apply to a
post-bankruptcy transaction? The principle of section 701 7-that one
dealing with, or indebted to, a bankrupt should know of his adjudication-corresponds in a sense to the knowledge that brings section
67d(3) into play: that liquidation is in contemplation. If the analogy
is at all persuasive, it supports the conclusion that the trustee is entitled to "one satisfaction" only. Unfortunately, the analogy also
suggests, in light of Stone v. Allied Clothing Corp.,"" that the bank
be subrogated to the claim of the trade creditor. Subrogation to a
creditor-position is an unfortunate remedy in a section 67d(3) case;
but it remains to be considered as a possibility where the trustee obtains double recoveries.
112. In granting relief in either form, a bankruptcy court would necessarily be denying cumulative remedies to the trustee.

113. See text accompanying note 89 supra.
114. Full payment to the creditor is assumed. If he was paid only in part, his
remaining share in the estate should be excluded from the computation. See RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION

§ 8Q (1937).-

115. The Restatement field for contribution is the duty "as to which, between the two,
." RESTATEMENT, REsTrUON § 81
neither had a prior 'duty of performance ....
(1937). "It is not within the scope of the Restatement of this Subject to state the
circumstances under which, where two persons are subject to a 'duty, each of them is
equally responsible therefor." Id.,commeht b.
116. Bankruptcy Act §67d(3) 52 Stat. 878 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 107d(3) (1964).
117. Bankruptcy Act § 70, 52Stat. 879 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110 (1964). See note
19 supra.
118. Supra note 76.
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The prospect that bankruptcy law governs a restitutionary claim
is enhanced, no doubt, if the relief sought will affect the size of the
estate-the fund available for distribution to ordinary creditors-and
it is enhanced if fraud on the estate is an element in the underlying
transaction. In Lake v. New York Life Insurance Co." 9 both of these
conditions obtained. The bankrupt committed a fraud upon the
estate, as well as upon the defendant insurers-a double-edged dolus.
In that respect, at least, the case can be distinguished from- the more
elementary situation wherein the estate is unjustly enriched: the
bankrupt obtains money by fraud and pays it over the trustee.
Whether or not the victim may hold the trustee accountable upon a
constructive trust is a "local question," the Supreme Court has said,
to be determined by state law. 120 On the other hand, it seems likely
that subrogation to a creditor-position is governed by bankruptcy
law if granting the relief would affect the dividends payable to
ordinary creditors.' 2 ' (As shown in the Stone case, subrogation may
or may not have this effect.) Even if there is fraud on the estate, nonbankruptcy law might be adequate for some forms of restitutionary
relief. After undoing the consequences so far as concerns the estate,
the bankruptcy court might well permit another victim to turn the
fraud to his own advantage, as an equity in his favor, so far as concerns competition for a share in the estate. Of course, if we assume
wrong-doing by a debtor in collusion with a creditor, that is another
story. Bankruptcy courts have made it their particular business to
undo fraud of that character; and the usual remedy is to marshal the
claims of creditors in favor of the innocent-or as it is usually put,
to subordinate the guilty creditor's claim.In
In the Bank of Matin case there was no fraud, and a demand for
contribution or idemnity as between the defendants does not affect
the quantum of the estate. Therefore it would not be unnatural to
test such a demand by state law. That would be so even if cumulative recoveries were granted to the trustee. In that case a provable
claim would arise in favor of the creditor, Eureka Fisheries, but there
would be at least a sympathetic argument for subrogating the bank
to the claim. A similar argument could be made in other cases of
double recoveries, canvassed earlier in this paper. In the "three bank"
case used to illustrate the scope of section 60, each bank would have
its own claim for 50,000 dollars, presumably, if the trustee succeeded
119. Supra note 106.
120. Jaffke v. Dunham, 352 U.S. 280 (1957). See also Gordon v. Spalding, 268 F.2d
327 (5th Cir. 1959); cf. Carpenter v. Southworth, 165 Fed. 428 (2d Cir. 1908).
121. As where a discharged claim that would have had priority is the one to which
subrogatory rights are asserted. See references cited in note 15 supra.
122. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). See Herzog & Zweibel, The Equitable
Subordination of Claims in Bankruptcy, 15 V~i-m. L. REv. 83 (1961).
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in avoiding the two preferential payments. It might occur to bank
B to file a "double claim": its own, plus that of bank A by way of
subrogation. (And bank C might be inspired to file a triple claim!
In point of fact, the third bank in the actual series of transactions
sought to impose a constructive trust on the trustee's recovery from
the first.'23) The equity looking toward subrogation must be more,
it seems, than the claimant's power to trace his funds into the hands
of another. Even if the claimant shows that his funds were wrongfully obtained or applied by the debtor, an innocent payee would
normally be excused from making restitution by the doctrine of bona
fide purchase.u 4 But possibly the equities of a post-bankruptcy payee
are not weighty enough to warrant the application of this rule;'2 5 and
the same might be said of a pre-bankruptcy payee, at least if he
were conscious of being preferred.1 26 On that basis one could justify
subrogation for the payor in the Bank of Marin case, and in Lake 1v.
28
27
New York Life Insurance Co., and possibly in the Stone case,
while denying it in an ordinary case of preferential transfer.
There is no necessity, it has been said, in disregarding state law
precedents for and against this variety of subrogation. The bona fide
purchaser defense is not a creature of bankruptcy law, and a bankruptcy court might well adopt the stance of a state court in reference
to it. On the other hand, the restitutionary problem is a peculiar
one as it arises in the bankruptcy context, 2 9 and for the most part
the solution provided by non-bankruptcy law would have to be
divined rather than discovered.1'3 If the problem is divorced from
123. First Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 217 F.2d 262 (10th Cir. 1954).

By pursuing a

claim against the estate as secured, the bank became bound to an election of remedies,
it was held.
124. See RESTATEMENT,

BEsTrrUTION §§

13, 14, 172-76 (1937).

125. "[Slince the rule that satisfaction of an antecedent debt is value has generally
been justified on the ground that creditors will rely on the payment . . . a court might

well create an exception here, for the creditors would not rely to their detriment where
the debtor is in bankruptcy."

Comment, 68 HIAv. L. REv. 1271, 1272 (1955).

126. Such was the fact in a number of the cases discussed herein, probably including those cited in note 46 supra.
127. Supra note 106. In substance, the credits claimed by the insurance companies
may have been a premature assertion of distribution rights under potential claims of
the creditors who were paid. Not knowing the character of those "claims," the court
was well advised not to prejudge a subrogatory interest in them.
128. 140 N.J. Eq. 224, 54 A.2d 625 (Ch. 1947). The bona fide purchase defense was
not mentioned by name here (in this connection), but the court gave reasons arguably
sufficient to override it.
129. It would be awkward to have the choice of law depend upon whether
cumulative recoveries may or may not be had by the trustee, because his position is
so uncertain at present, in situations where the restitutionary problem exists.
130. A reference to state law in Bank of Main, supra note 108, leads to Cal. Civ.
Proc. Code § 709. The statute does not appear to be either a substantive basis or an
exclusive procedure for allocating liability as between joint judgment debtors. See
Tucker v. Nicholson, 12 Cal. 2d 427, 84 P.2d 1045 (1938); Stowers v. Fletcher, 84 Cal.
App. 2d (Supp.) 845, 190 P.2d 338 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1948).
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the bankruptcy issue of "double recovery," a skillful solution is not
very likely to be reached. It would not be surprising, therefore, to
find that, as to any claim arising when the trustee avoids a transfer,
the only right of subrogation is "bankruptcy subrogation." It is at
least plausible to say that state law of restitution is displaced, so far
as concerns cumulative remedies of the trustee, by principles immanent in the Bankruptcy Act-themselves partly restitutionary in
131
character.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Bankruptcy courts take the law of restitution as they find it, for
the most part. Restitutionary rights asserted by the trustee as successor to the bankrupt should be assessed on the same basis as if
the bankrupt were the plaintiff. 132 Similarly, such rights asserted
against the estate as "debts of the bankrupt" should be evaluated
by non-bankruptcy law. Nevertheless, special problems of restitution
arise in amassing and distributing a bankrupt's estate, for which state
law may not yield authoritative solutions. The components of the
idea "unjust enrichment" are not constant for all situations in which
the concept operates, and they should be carefully adjusted to fit the
bankruptcy situation.'3 One cannot simply translate ordinary restitutionary concepts bodily into the context of bankruptcy; the rigidities
of the act itself forbid it.
Many of the most striking features -of the Bankruptcy Act are
obviously inspired by a restitutionary ideal: the prevention of windfall gains by (or at the expense of) creditors at large. There is, for
instance, a set of clauses introduced to cover the case of a junior
security interest, effective in bankruptcy, which would be promoted
in rank if the trustee succeeded in avoiding the senior security. The
act provides, so as to prevent a windfall to the junior party, that "the
court may on due notice order such [senior] lien to be preserved for
the benefit of the estate ... ."134 Probably it was not necessary to
131. Particularly under § 67d(3) the problem of restitution is so heavily enmeshed
in the objectives of the act that its solution probably lies in the interstices of the
statute. The argument is by no means conclusive, however.
132. See In re ABC-Federal Oil & Burner Co., 290 F.2d 886 (3d Cir. 1961). (This
case further adumbrates the career of Eugene M. Callis, whose bankruptcy gave rise to
the case of Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., note 106 supra).
133. "The conception of unjust enrichment as ordinarily defined includes not only
gain on one side but loss on the other, with a tie of causation between them ...
Actually, these components, appearing in an immense variety of situations, are highly
variable both in their own content and in their interconnections." Dawson, Restitution
or Damages?, 20 OMo ST. L.J. 175, 176 (1959).
134. Or, such transfer, title, or obligation, as the case may be. Bankruptcy Act §§
6Ob, 67a(3), 67c, 67d(6), 70e(2), 52 Stat. 870, 876, 877, 878, 882 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
§§ 94b, 107a(3), 107c, 107d(6), 110e(2) (1964).
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amend the act to cover such a case, for the law of bankruptcy is
roomy enough to let in the ordinary remedies for preventing unjust
enrichment. 135 As Judge Lord, has recently reminded us, "courts of
bankruptcy are essentially courts of equity."136 Particularly it has
been suggested that, where connected transactions give rise to "cumulative remedies" for the trustee, it is the province of bankruptcy law
to regulate their employment.
We might even speculate that the trustee's powers and responsibilities may one day be founded largely on restitutionary principles.
For instance, the law of preferences might be reformed so as to
measure the trustee's power of recovery by the unjustified loss to
the estate. Where there has been a mere substitution of creditors,
it would follow that no voidable transfer has occurred. I have argued
that this is not a proper deduction from the act as it stands. The
restitutionary ideal is far from a trustworthy guide in bankruptcy matters generally, and the courts will do well to await a fresh legislative
mandate before they try to strike some ultimate balance of equities
between creditor and creditor.
Having these reservations in mind, we must acknowledge that
certain "bankruptcy principles of restitiition" exist. Cautiously developed, they can properly supplement and enrich the facilities for
justice that bankruptcy courts administer.
135. The same effect was achieved on general "anti-windfall" principles, before these
provisions were introduced (1952). "In Matter of.,Espelund, D.C., 181 F. Supp. 103,
112, it was stated that the rule then was that, upon invalidation of a senior mortgage
as against a bankruptcy trustee, a junior lienor became elevated in rank as against
the trustee, even though the junior lienor had acquired his lien with notice of the
existence of the senior lien. However, the authorities relied on therein for that proposition do not in fact support it (White v. Steinman, 2 Cir. 120 F.2d 799; Matter of
Andrews, 7 Cir., 172 F.2d 996). . . . The 1952 amendment settled the problem
clearly in favor of the trustee and contrary to the supposed rule to which reference
was made in Matter of Espelund (supra)." In re Edward Bibinger, Inc., 12 App. Div.
2d 237,239-40, 210 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321-22 (2d Dep't 1961).
136. In re Elkins-Dell Mfg. Co., 253 F. Supp. 864, 867 (E.D. Pa. 1966).

